http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/site/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/62845/index.do 
Sotski v. The Queen[1] (September 10, 2013) is case involving the deduction of home repairs in the amount of $3,675 to accommodate a medical disability:
[2] The facts are not generally in dispute. The Appellant’s husband suffers from the progressively debilitating Parkinson’s disease that, without dispute by either party, constitutes a severe and prolonged physical disability, which makes walking on surfaces that offer friction like carpets both difficult and unsafe due to risks from falling. Due to both the difficulty in raising his feet above a friction offering surface like carpeting and the forward leaning posture of her husband due to the disease, as well as the added problem of his psoriatic arthritis which causes his toes to turn in, the husband was at serious risk of having the carpet arrest his feet and forcing him into a fall; essentially risking injuring himself, the Appellant as his in-home caregiver and any outside caregivers who try to assist him. As a result, the Appellant, a person with experience in caregiving, attended at a flooring centre, and after obtaining the advice of the dealer having regard to her husband’s needs, replaced the fairly new carpet in their five-year old home with very modestly‑priced engineered smooth laminate flooring to eliminate the resistance and hence reduced the physical effort and resulting fatigue as well as the risk of fall to all as mentioned.
The Crown did not dispute the husband’s medical condition. Rather it argued that the two requirements found in paragraph 118.2(2)(l.2) of the Income Tax Act[2] were not met:
(l.2) … provided that such expenses
(i) are not of a type that would typically be expected to increase the value of the dwelling, and
(ii) are of a type that would not normally be incurred by persons who have normal physical development or who do not have a severe and prolonged mobility impairment;
The court applied a common sense approach to the facts and the presumed intent of Parliament. It made no sense that replacing relatively new, good quality carpet with modestly priced laminate would improve the value of the property. Nor did the evidence support the idea that the taxpayer would have incurred this expense except for her husband’s disability:
[16] In interpreting the provisions of the paragraph, one cannot lose sight of the policies of Parliament, both in enacting the Medical Expense Tax Credit and in the amendments. The Medical Expense Tax Credits were designed to grant relief to taxpayers who suffer from serious and prolonged mental and physical impairments, to assist them with dealing with the extra costs incurred by them as a result of their condition. The amendments to the provisions in 2005 were to avoid abuses of those provisions. The Respondent in this case does not disagree with the existence of the Appellant husband’s impairments and even agrees that the installation of the engineered laminate flooring assists in alleviating his symptoms and addressing his condition. The Respondent does not take issue with the Appellant’s purpose and intent in having the flooring installed to assist her husband with mobility and reduce fatigue and risk of injury by providing a surface of lesser resistance in her dwelling, those requirements spelled out in subsection 118.2(2). The Respondent only relies on his technical interpretation of the two conditions in such paragraph (l.2) pointing to the Budget Papers and Technical Notes to suggest the intention of Parliament was to categorize the types of expenditures in general, including all hardwood flooring. I simply do not agree.
[17] Parliament, having regard to its policy of avoiding abuse in medical expenditures, set out two conditions designed to avoid abuse. It did not specifically categorize expenditures such as hardwood floorings, or hot tubs or swimming pools are being prohibited in its language and while the language of the Budget Papers and Explanatory Notes made mention of these types of abuses, these were the types being set out as examples because they were the types that were the subject matter of the cases the Department of Finance took issue with as being abusive in those circumstances. In the circumstances at hand, I do not find that replacing a quality carpet flooring of only five years old with modestly-priced engineered laminate flooring instead of higher-priced solid hardwood to be abusive. The Appellant did not attempt to buy a luxury floor or upgrade the quality of her dwelling by installing the floor she did. She instead only put in what was necessary, without the intent or expectation of having the taxpayer fund her personal consumption choices. Had she installed, say high-end solid mahogany instead of lower-end engineered flooring, one could question her motives and arrive at a reasonable conclusion that this would not only increase the value of his dwelling but also be of the type of higher-end material most taxpayers would no doubt be happy to have his fellow taxpayers fund. This was not the case here. There is no abuse and the conditions of paragraph 118.2(2)(l.2), interpreted with the policies of Parliament in mind, have been met so the appeal is allowed in full.
This case is a refreshing departure from the narrow, technical tone that often permeates decisions about medical expenses. It is also one of the rare cases where a feisty taxpayer has successfully represented herself before the Tax Court.
[1] 2013 TCC 286.
[2] R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp. ), as amended.